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Abstract
There has been a renewed focus on the development of innovative screening procedures and
technologies since the September 11th attacks. While attention has been placed on the need for more
effective screening methods, there has been a lack of research on screening for future intent, which is
remarkable given its importance to national security (Granhag, 2010; Martin, Martin, & Coskren, 2007).
The current project draws on previous research on deception detection and investigative interviewing,
as well as recent research on false intent in order to investigate the utility of several interviewing
methods in screening for intent. Participants (N = 144) went through a security screening module. After
passing through the primary screening process, participants entered secondary screening where they
were interviewed using either an anxiety-based, cognitive-based, or direct questioning approach.
Results indicated that interviewers and independent observers demonstrated a truth bias when making
determinations about false intent, and that overall accuracy rates were no better than chance
performance. Some support for the use of cognitive-based interview methods was obtained when
reviewers used a coding tool based on empirically validated cues to deception.
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Examination of Investigative Interviewing Techniques for Use in Secondary Screening for Malintent
On December 25, 2009 Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to detonate an explosive device
that was sewn into his underwear while on board a Detroit-bound flight (Nossiter, 2010). Although his
attempt failed, the incident reminded US citizens of our nation’s vulnerability to terrorist attacks. With
the continued existence of threats to national security since the September 11th attacks, research
initiatives have focused on developing screening procedures, methods, and technologies that might aid
in the prevention of future attacks. For example, travelers may be asked to go through full-body
scanners to ensure no contraband is hidden on their person. With the development of these screening
procedures and technologies, corresponding questioning and interviewing methods need to be designed
and tested in order to increase the effectiveness of the screening process.
A distinction can be made between two types of screening: primary screening and secondary
screening. Primary screening generally involves a brief, initial interaction with the broad purpose of early
recognition of suspicious individuals. Screeners could be looking for contraband, like weapons or illegal
substances, or looking for suspicious behavior to identify potential human threats. For example, when
re-entering the country travelers must go through a brief security screening with a Customs Agent
during which they may be asked a series of questions about where they traveled and the purpose for
travel. Using the above definition, these types of interactions would be considered primary screening.
If a person’s behavior or property is deemed suspicious during primary screening (or through random
screening selections), the person may be sent for additional evaluation, which is referred to as
secondary screening. Secondary screening may consist of a more extensive physical search of the person
or their property and may include a more in-depth interview. In the Customs inspection example, a
traveler may be sent to secondary screening if the primary screening agent deems the traveler’s
responses suspicious. During the secondary screening interview, the agent must decide whether or not
1

the traveler poses a security threat and whether the situation requires further action. In sum, while
primary screening may establish a person’s behavior or property as suspicious, secondary screening is
vital in making determinations of whether or not further detention is warranted.
Regardless of whether screening is in the primary or secondary phase, the type of intelligence
being sought may vary. The majority of research and technology development to date has focused on
screening for contraband, suspicious behavior, and detecting past behavior. A perhaps more difficult
task, and arguably more central to national security, is screening for planned future events. It has
recently been noted that such research on true and false intent has been missing in the field of legal
psychology (Granhag, 2010; Martin, Martin, & Coskren, 2007). Granhag (2010) has defined intent as the
“mental state preceding a corresponding action.” Given the significance of situations in which
assessments of the veracity of one’s intentions is warranted, it is surprising that research in this area is
lacking. Therefore, researchers have called for the development of empirically based methods to detect
future true and malicious intent (Granhag, 2010; Martin et al., 2007).
Theory of Malintent. As a first step in the development of empirically based methods for
screening of intent, Martin, Martin, and Coskren (2007) developed the theory of malintent. The theory
defines malintent as the “intention or desire to cause harm” and is thought of in the specific context of
intending harm to the country’s citizens or its infrastructure (Martin et al., 2007, p. 1). The theory draws
from deception detection research to predict the behavioral and psychophysiological cues that are
manifestations of the underlying emotional, behavioral, and cognitive processes a person with malintent
may experience. The theory of malintent hypothesizes that identifying an individual with malintent
becomes more likely as the magnitude and consequences of the event increase and as the distance to
execution of the event decreases. It is predicted that deceptive individuals and those with malintent
may experience similar emotional, behavioral, and cognitive processes and therefore display similar
cues. While deception detection research focuses on the physiological and behavioral cues a person
2

exhibits while lying about a past event, malintent detection focuses on the cues a person exhibits
regarding a planned future act. The current project seeks to develop and test methods for secondary
screening for malicious intent by drawing on previous research on deception detection, intent detection,
and investigative interviewing.
Deception Detection
As previously stated, research on future intent and cues to malicious intent are lacking
(Granhag, 2010; Martin et al., 2007). However, looking to decades of research on deception detection
has provided insight into the cues that may be indicative of false intent. Unfortunately, research has
shown that both lay people and law enforcement professionals usually perform at near chance levels in
deception detection tasks (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Vrij, 2008). For law enforcement professionals, this
poor performance could be due to a guilt bias and erroneous beliefs about which deception cues are
actually indicative of deception (Kassin, Meissner, & Norwick, 2005; Meissner & Kassin, 2002).
Nevertheless, improving individuals’ ability to detect deception has proved to be a difficult undertaking.
Recent meta-analyses have examined the verbal (i.e., number of details, statement length),
nonverbal (i.e., head nods, gestures), and paraverbal cues (i.e., pitch, vocal tension) to deception in
order to determine those with the most empirical support. The DePaulo et al. (2003) meta-analysis
examined 1338 estimates of 158 deception cues. Deception was significantly associated with several
paraverbal and nonverbal cues including increases in pitch and vocal tension and decreases in the
frequency of illustrators. Several verbal cues showed significant relationships with deception including
decreases in verbal immediacy (clear and direct speech), the number of details revealed, logical
structure of the account, overall talking time, spontaneous corrections, and an admitted lack of
memory. Sporer and Schwandt (2006; 2007) have also conducted two meta-analyses on the nonverbal
and paraverbal cues to deception. In their first meta-analysis of paraverbal cues, results from 41 studies
were combined and analyzed. Results indicated that liars exhibited higher vocal pitch, longer response
3

latencies, more speech errors, and shorter messages (Sporer & Schwandt, 2006). In their second metaanalysis, results from 54 studies were combined and analyzed in order to examine moderating factors of
nonverbal cues of deceit (Sporer & Schwandt, 2007). Results indicated that three behavioral cues were
predictive of deception: decreased nodding, decreased leg and foot movements, and decreased hand
movements. When participants were deceptive about facts versus their feelings, there was a decrease in
eye contact, head nodding, and illustrators as well as an increase in head movements (Sporer
&Schwandt, 2007). Taken together, these three meta-analyses reveal some consistency in the literature
for cues such as pitch, length of account, and illustrators; however, there is also great variability in the
types of cues displayed, and the effect sizes for all of the findings described above are in the small to
medium range.
In addition to the variability in findings and small effect sizes, other criticisms of the deception
detection literature exist. One of the most common criticisms of the research is that most of the studies
to date have been conducted in laboratory settings using college students as participants and therefore
may not be generalizable to real world scenarios (DePaulo et al., 2003; Hazlett, 2006). Also, participants
are usually instructed to lie or tell the truth and may not be highly motivated to be perceived as truthful
(DePaulo et al., 2003; Hazlett, 2006). Finally, an additional criticism of previous research is the lack of
cross-cultural investigations of deception detection which would be particularly useful in intelligence
gathering and screening contexts (Hazlett, 2006). In an attempt to further the literature and avoid some
potential limitations, the current project will recruit from the general population to achieve a crosscultural sample, provide participants the option of engaging in a malicious task (to ensure motivation
and intent), and use a highly realistic security screening paradigm (for improved generalizability).
The preceding review of the deception detection literature shows that prior research has
focused almost exclusively on cues to deception elicited when lying about a past event. As previously
noted, the theory of malintent predicts that both deceptive individuals and those with malintent may
4

experience similar emotional, behavioral, and cognitive processes (Martin et al., 2007). Therefore, it is
predicted that individuals with malintent may exhibit a similar pattern of physiological and behavioral
cues when discussing future intent as deceptive individuals lying about past behavior.
Recently researchers have proposed new interviewing methods that may work to exploit the
differences between liars and truth tellers by enhancing deception cues, rather than relying upon the
passive observation of cues elicited through traditional methods (Vrij, Fisher, Mann, & Leal, 2010).
Training interviewers to actively elicit cues using these strategic interviewing approaches may therefore
improve the ability to detect deception (Vrij et al., 2010). The current study sought to further
investigate this area of research by modifying these methods to fit the security screening context and
examine the utility of these methods for malintent detection. Before discussing the methodology, I first
review the relevant research on investigative interviewing methods currently used by law enforcement
for confession elicitation, information gathering, and deception detection. I then examine some of the
information gathering cognitive-based approaches in order to evaluate which methods may be
applicable to screening for future intent.
Interview Techniques
There are two contrasting interview techniques often discussed in the literature: traditional
(anxiety-based) approaches and information gathering (cognitive-based) approaches.
Traditional (anxiety-based) approaches. Traditional interviewing approaches involve
confronting the individual with an accusation in an attempt to increase feelings of anxiety and pressure
in the guilty suspect but not the innocent (Vrij, Mann, & Fisher, 2006). For example, the interviewer may
say, “I know you committed the theft. Your reactions make me think you’re trying to hide something. ”
The underlying theory holds that liars will be more nervous and tense than truth tellers during the
interview and this anxiety will manifest itself through verbal and nonverbal behavioral indicators of
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deception (Vrij et al., 2010). This is the type of approach that law enforcement officers use on a regular
basis.
There are several popular manuals and texts on interrogation including Walters’ (1996) Kinesic
Interviewing, Royal and Schutt’s (1976) approach, and Reid and colleagues’ (e.g., Inbau et al., 2004)
technique (see Neuman & Salinas-Serrano, 2006). These techniques are generally based on the idea
that deceit on the part of the suspect can be discovered through psychological manipulation. The
hypothesis is that increasing levels of anxiety will force a person to confess in order to reduce anxiety,
and that even before the confession a person may engage in physical activities to reduce this anxiety
(Gudjonsson, 2003; Neuman & Salinas-Serrano, 2006). As a result of this increasing anxiety, suspects are
believed to engage in various verbal and nonverbal behaviors that serve as either signals of discomfort
or are the result of a suspect’s attempts at reducing the anxiety – and these verbal and nonverbal
behaviors therefore serve as potential cues to the veracity of the suspect’s statements.
In order to increase the anxiety level of the suspect, the interviewer may engage in several
behaviors such as asking guilt presumptive questions and shutting down denials of guilt. The interviewer
may also use maximization techniques, which are confrontational in nature and use intimidation to
persuade the suspect to confess (Kassin & McNall, 1991). For example, the interviewer may present
false evidence of guilt, exaggerate the seriousness of the offense, or maintain a firm stance on the guilt
of the suspect. The interviewer may also use minimization techniques, which are “soft sell” tactics that
attempt to mislead the suspect into a false sense of security (Kassin & McNall, 1991). For example, the
interviewer may justify the situation, sympathize with the suspect to gain trust, or reduce the perceived
consequences of confessing to the offense.
An example of these types of techniques is the Behavior Analysis Interview (BAI), which is the
first step of the Reid Technique. This preinterrogation interview is conducted to identify any deception
on the part of the suspect through his or her verbal and nonverbal behavior. However, research
6

suggests that law enforcement officers, as well as the average person, perform only slightly better than
chance when attempting to detect truth and deception (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Vrij, 2008). Results from
one study investigating the effectiveness of the BAI indicated that it actually produced a pattern in
which false presumptions of guilt could be placed on innocent suspects, which is opposite of the
intended purpose of the BAI (Vrij et al., 2006). Despite the research indicating people are poor lie
detectors, the Reid Technique encourages investigators to interrogate suspects only after they have
been deemed deceptive during the BAI (Neuman & Salinas-Serrano, 2006). The literature suggests that
relying on the verbal and nonverbal behaviors of suspects during these types of interviews leads to
inaccurate judgments of deception and these judgments can negatively impact decisions to detain
suspects.
Vrij, Mann, and Fisher (2006) compared the experiences of truthful and deceptive participants
who underwent an anxiety-based interview or an information gathering interview. Results indicated that
participants in the anxiety-based accusatory condition felt more uncomfortable and exhibited fewer
nonverbal cues to deception than those in the information gathering interview (Vrij et al., 2006). In
another study comparing interview styles, the researchers found that accusatory interviews led to
shorter denials and elicited fewer verbal cues to deception than information gathering interviews (Vrij,
Mann, Kristen, & Fisher, 2007). Additionally, when the videotaped interviews were subsequently shown
to police officers, those viewing anxiety-based interviews made more false accusations and were more
confident in their incorrect veracity judgments (Vrij et al., 2007). Taken together, the results of these
studies indicate that, despite their popularity in the law enforcement community, accusatorial, anxietybased interviews may not be the most effective approach for educing information and detecting
deception. In fact, it appears that these types of interviews can lead to increased confidence in
incorrect decisions.
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Information gathering (cognitive-based) approaches. While traditional anxiety-based
interviewing approaches are based on the hypothesis that liars will exhibit more cues with increased
fear, pressure, and anxiety, cognitive-based information gathering approaches are built on the idea that
lying requires more cognitive resources than truth telling. Therefore, if the interview places additional
cognitive demand on the liar, cues to deception are more likely to be elicited (Vrij, Fisher, Mann, & Leal,
2006). According to this theory, lying is more cognitively demanding than truth telling for several
reasons. First, generating a lie while at the same time suppressing the truth is an intentional and
deliberate act that requires more cognitive resources than telling the truth (Vrij et al., 2010).
Furthermore, in addition to generating the lie, liars must monitor and manage their own behavior to
avoid detection and observe the responses of the interviewer to determine if the interviewer believes
the story (Vrij et al., 2010). Psychophysiological research has confirmed predictions that lying increases
cognitive load. Using fMRI, researchers have shown that areas of the brain associated with higher order
and executive functions are activated when someone is lying (Spence et al., 2004) and that this
increased cognitive demand reduces tonic (basal or resting) arousal in liars in the form of decreased skin
conductance and blink rate (Leal, Vrij, Fisher, & van Hooff, 2008).
Interviewers can exploit the fact that liars have fewer cognitive resources available by asking
interviewees to complete additional cognitively demanding tasks during the interview. This is thought to
result in increased displays of cognitive load in liars including a slower rate of speech with more pauses
and hesitations, less overall movement, and fewer central details (Vrij et al., 2010). In short, it is
hypothesized that these interventions will be more challenging for liars compared to truth tellers (Vrij et
al., 2010). Strategic techniques suggested for increasing cognitive load include asking interviewees to tell
their story in reverse order, instructing interviewees to maintain eye contact with the interviewer, and
having interviewees complete additional (unexpected) tasks like drawing during the interview (Vrij et al.,
2010).
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Vrij and colleagues have begun to evaluate the utility of these cognitive load inducing
interventions systematically (Vrij et al., 2008). In order to examine the effects of reverse order recall,
participants were randomly assigned to either a truthful or deceptive condition. Those in the truthful
condition were instructed to play a game with a confederate. During this time, another individual
entered the room, wiped information off a blackboard, and left. Shortly after that interruption, another
individual entered the room looking for a missing wallet. Liars did not participate in this staged event
but were given a detailed synopsis. Participants were then asked to recall as much of the event as
possible and half of the liars and truth tellers were also asked to recall their account in reverse order.
Results indicated that those participants in the reverse order condition displayed more deceptive cues
and signs of cognitive load than those in the control condition including more speech hesitations and
errors as well as more leg and foot movements (Vrij et al., 2008). The researchers then showed the
videotapes of the interviews to police officers and asked them to make veracity judgments. None of the
police officers had received any training in deception detection. Results indicated that deception
detection rates significantly improved and were above chance levels in the reverse order recall condition
compared to the control condition (Vrij et al., 2008).
A similar procedure to the one described above was employed to test the effect of another
technique for increasing cognitive load, namely maintaining eye contact with the interviewer. In this
study, half of the participants were instructed to maintain eye contact with the interviewer when
providing their accounts and half were given no instructions (Vrij et al., 2010). Compared to truth tellers,
liars in the eye contact condition provided fewer temporal and spatial details, which are signs of both
cognitive load and deception, and gave their accounts in sequential order. As in the previous study,
independent raters viewed the videos of the interviews and provided determinations of statement
veracity. Although there was no difference in discrimination accuracy between the control and eye
contact conditions, raters were able to discriminate lies from truths when asked on a Likert-type scale
9

about truthfulness (Vrij et al., 2010). Another suggested manner of increasing the cognitive demand
placed on an individual during an interview is to instruct participants to engage in a secondary,
distracter task while being interviewed; however, to my knowledge, results related to this intervention
have not yet been published (Vrij et al., 2010).
In addition to the cognitive load inducing interview techniques described above, other strategic
interviewing methods have been proposed that would also mentally challenge liars compared to truth
tellers. Asking unanticipated questions is one such method that may induce cognitive load and shows
promise in discriminating liars from truth tellers (Vrij et al., 2009). To test this strategic technique,
truthful participants went to lunch in pairs while deceptive participants were told to pretend they had
done the same activity. Participants were then interviewed about their experience. They were asked
spatial and temporal questions and were asked to draw the restaurant’s layout, which was an
unexpected task. Based on the responses to just these questions, participants were accurately classified
by condition 80% of the time (Vrij et al., 2009). These results suggest that asking unexpected questions
about topics central to the target event to unsuspecting liars can elicit cues to deceit and aid in
deception detection (Vrij et al., 2009).Taken together, the results of these studies indicate that
increasing cognitive load can actively elicit cues to deception, which may be more effective than the
observation of cues previously used in conjunction with traditional anxiety-based methods (Evans,
Meissner, & Brandon, 2010; Vrij et al., 2010).
The current research project compared the use of anxiety-based and cognitive-based interview
approaches in secondary screening for intent in a highly realistic scenario. As reviewed above, previous
research demonstrates that increasing the cognitive load of deceptive interviewees can elicit cues to
deception. The current research modified the cognitive-based and anxiety-based techniques to screen
for intent in an attempt to determine malintent status from the cues elicited from participants being
interviewed regarding their future intent.
10

The Current Study
The current project was completed as part of the Future Attribute Screening Technologies
(FAST) program funded by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Using the theory of malintent
(Martin et al., 2007) as its foundation, the FAST program’s objective is to increase the accuracy and
validity of the identification of persons planning destructive acts through the development and testing
of innovative technologies combined with theory-based, applied social and behavioral research. The
FAST program is in its fourth year of applied research. The program recently shifted focus from
screening for malintent at points of entry and large events to screening of employees for malintent at
stadiums and arenas.
Purpose. The purpose of the current study was to develop and test operationally relevant
interview methods that will maximize the amount of accurate information elicited and improve
malintent discrimination within a limited period of time. The interview conditions examined were based
on the anxiety-based and cognitive-based interviewing techniques previously described, as well as a
direct questioning approach that served as a baseline comparison condition. The project was conducted
as part of a larger screening study using a novel paradigm developed specifically for the FAST program.
The current study received Institutional Review Board approval from the New England Institutional
Review Board (NEIRB), which is an independent, accredited IRB located in the Boston area.
Interview method utility was evaluated using several dependent measures. First, the
interviewers made determinations of malintent status in order to investigate accuracy as a function of
interview method. These determinations of malintent were compared to the real time algorithm
analysis of the primary screening system (which relies upon remote, noncontact sensors of physiological
responses including pupil diameter, gross body movement, thermal signature, respiration, and cardiac
activity) in order to determine if the secondary interview adds any additional diagnostic information to
the entire screening process. Participants were asked to provide information about the nature of the
11

interview and their experiences during the interview including how much pressure, stress, and anxiety
they felt during the screening process and interview in order to gain insight into the underlying
emotional processes occurring during the interview. In addition, both trained and naïve independent
raters reviewed the video recordings of the interviews to examine the verbal, nonverbal, and paraverbal
indicators of malintent and make determinations of malintent status.
Hypotheses for the current study are as follows:
H1: Participants with malintent will feel more pressure, stress, and anxiety based on self report
measures of pressure, stress, and anxiety, and scores on the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI:
Spielberger, Gorush, Luschene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) during the screening process and interview,
especially in the anxiety-based interview condition.
H2: The secondary screening determinations of malintent status given by the interviewers will provide
diagnostic information to complement the primary screening system by increasing malintent detection
accuracy, especially in the cognitive-based interview condition.
H3: The cognitive-based interview approach will increase malintent discrimination accuracy of the
interviewers and independent raters by eliciting greater verbal, behavioral, and paraverbal cues of
malintent as coded via the Psychologically Based Credibility Assessment Tool (PBCAT: Evans, Meissner, &
Brandon, 2010) compared to either the direct questioning or anxiety-based interview approach

12

Phase 1
Method
Participants. Participants (N = 144) with experience in the food service industry were recruited
through advertisements in Boston area media outlets. Based on previous studies (Russano, Meissner,
Narchet, & Kassin, 2005; Lassiter, Greers, Handley, Weiland, & Munhall, 2002), a cell size of 30 was
estimated to achieve an effect size of d = .50 with power = .80 at alpha = .05 level. Due to resource
limitations and data collection issues, a cell size of 24 was achieved. Participants for this experiment
were males (55.6%) and females (43.4%) with a mean age of 38.9 (SD = 11.42) and a high school
education plus some additional education (years of education M = 13.71, SD = 2.0). At the time of
recruitment, participants were told that they would be working as catering staff for a special event
inside a large technology facility and would be required to go through security screening prior to
entering the building. Participants were told they would be paid $15 per hour of work. The experiment
took place over two days at two locations and lasted approximately 3 hours, although participants were
led to believe they would be working an additional half day at the event.
Design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of six experimental conditions based on a 2
(malintent vs. truthful) x 3 (interview method: direct vs. cognitive-based vs. anxiety-based) betweensubjects factorial design (see Table 1). Participants in the malintent condition were randomly assigned to
either the malintent without device condition or the malintent smuggle condition, which are described
in more detail below. Although two types of malintent were examined as part of the larger experiment,
these were collapsed for the purposes of this project.
Procedure. Individuals who responded to advertisements completed a brief telephone
screening for initial eligibility with a researcher. This assessment identified potential participants as
ineligible due to mental or physical conditions that would negatively impact participation or due to the
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use of any medications or drugs that would negatively impact sensor data collection. Once deemed
eligible, participants scheduled an appointment for the first research session.
Day One Briefing. During the first research session, participants met with a researcher to review
the consent form and purpose of the study. Participants were told that they were being hired to work as
catering staff for a special event with several VIPs in attendance. In order to enter the facility they would
have to go through a security screening module that was being tested. In actuality, the study examined
the utility of sensor technology in malintent detection in primary and secondary screening. Although
participants were not told about the malintent condition during the informed consent interview, they
were informed that some people may find portions of the study to be stressful. After signing the consent
form, participants completed several assessments including a demographic information questionnaire
and the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorush, Luschene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) in
order to obtain a baseline measure of anxiety. After completing these scales, participants were
reminded of the next scheduled appointment which was on the day of the fictitious VIP event.
Day Two Briefing. At the beginning of the second research session, the researcher reviewed the
consent form with the participant to ensure that the person continued to consent to participate.
Participants were informed that they would be working as catering staff at a special event in a nearby
technology building. In order to enter the facility, they would need to go through a new security
screening system because of the VIPs in attendance at the event. Participants were told to expect two
officers. The first would ask for personal identification and an official work schedule which was provided
by the researcher. Inside the screening module, a second officer would ask 12 yes or no questions while
multiple noncontact sensors measured their physiology. A third officer acted as the secondary screening
interviewer. Participants were informed that they would only undergo secondary screening if they were
flagged during primary screening; in actuality, all participants were sent to secondary screening.
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Three officers from a private security agency filled the role of all three security officers. The
officers were all male with a mean age of 25.67 (SD = 2.52) and at least a high school education (years of
education M = 13.0, SD = 1.0). All three served in the military (M= 7.0 years, SD = 1.73) and had a mean
of 4.33 years of security experience (SD = 2.52). All three officers reported they were fairly confident in
their ability to detect malintent (M = 2.67, SD = .58 on a 5-point Likert scale) and were very motivated to
detect malintent (M = 4.0, SD = 1.73 on a 5-point Likert scale).
Once participants agreed to work for the day and go through the experimental screening
module, they were randomly assigned to either the truthful or malintent conditions. Participants
assigned to the truthful condition were told to pass through the screening module, answer all the
officer’s questions truthfully, and continue to the employee entrance for work. Those participants
randomly assigned to one of the malintent conditions were told that they had been selected to
complete an additional task and could earn a $100 bonus, but the task may be considered stressful or
cause some additional anxiety. Participants then decided whether or not to complete the additional
task. Those participants (n = 12 out of 144) that decided not to complete the additional task were
debriefed, paid the full $90, and escorted out of the facility.
After being assigned to a condition, participants were given an envelope and left alone in a
testing room to review its contents. Participants received a CD to listen to the instructions as well as a
written copy to review. The envelope also contained a copy of their work schedule and a red index card.
The index card served as a way for participants to signal their desire to withdraw from the study at any
time. After passing through screening, participants were told to enter the facility and receive further
instructions about their job from the catering manager.
Malintent participants were given one of two sets of instructions, either for the malintent
without device condition or the malintent smuggle condition. Both conditions involve working with a
partner to complete a malicious task. Malintent without device participants were told to go through the
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screening module, enter the facility, and meet their partner. Their partner would have an explosive
device that would cause a disturbance at the event and the participant’s job was to detonate the device.
Other participants randomly assigned to the smuggling malintent condition were asked to smuggle a
camera into the event, meet their partner inside, and take pictures of the VIPs illegally. Malintent
participants were told that if they were caught by the officers, both they and their partner would lose
any money they had already earned and would not be allowed to work at the event.
Participants in all conditions were told that if the officers found their identification or answers to
any of the questions suspicious, they would be flagged for secondary screening. Secondary screening
was described as an in depth interview that could last from 1 to 3 hours. The threat of further screening
and detention, and the bonus for malintent participants, were intended to increase motivation to
proceed through screening undetected. In reality, all participants went to secondary screening and it is
this portion of the experiment that is the focal point of this project.
After reviewing the instruction packets, all participants were given about 10 min to plan their
activities for the remainder of the day. In order to facilitate the planning phase, participants were given
a fictitious map of the facility that included the location of the screening modules, employee entrance,
kitchen, and event room. Participants were also given the daily menu, list of tasks to be completed, and
the seating arrangement for the event room. Truthful participants were instructed to review directions
to the kitchen where they were to report to the catering manager and to familiarize themselves with the
menu and tasks. Malintent participants were told to plan out the execution of their primary task and
also create a cover story in case they are stopped by a security officer.
Day Two Screening. After participants finished reviewing the instructions and planning their
tasks, the researcher entered the testing room and introduced participants to their partner who was
actually a confederate. The use of the confederate was intended to increase ecological validity, increase
motivation to complete the task, and control flow of the experiment. Participants then walked to the
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screening module with the confederate, engaging in a scripted interaction according to condition, and
entered the line for the screening. The confederate attempted to have each participant enter the queue
first. In some sessions, the participant wanted the confederate to go through the screening first. In these
situations, the confederate was held in screening for five min in order to maintain realism and was then
escorted out of screening surreptitiously.
The first officer asked for identification and the work schedule and escorted participants into the
screening module. Once inside the screening module, the second officer asked 12 questions requiring a
yes or no response based on the Utah Relevant Relevant Paradigm (RRP) developed by Kircher and
colleagues at the University of Utah (J. Kircher, personal communication, July, 2008). This paradigm
includes three question types: two types are relevant questions likely to trigger a behavioral or
psychophysiological response, and the other type is neutral questions that serve as controls. One set of
the relevant questions (R1) pertain to smuggling a recording device. For example, participants were
asked, “Do you intend to use an illegal recording device inside the facility?” The second set of relevant
questions (R2) relate to causing a disturbance at the event. For example, participants were asked, “Do
you intend to cause a disturbance inside the facility?” Neutral questions inquire about the day of the
week or current month. In comparing the two sets of relevant questions, participants with malintent
should respond more strongly to the questions pertaining to the specific type of malintent they have
(smuggling in a camera or detonating an explosive device). Each participant was asked 12 questions (3
R1 questions, 3 R2 questions, and 6 neutral questions). After each question there was a 17 second
pause to allow the participants’ physiology to return to baseline levels. At the end of this series of
questions the officer informed participants that they would need to answer a few additional questions
in an adjoining room.
In order to investigate the utility of the described interviewing approaches in malintent
detection, all participants were escorted into the secondary screening room. Sending all participants for
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further screening also allowed the researchers to examine participants’ physiological reactions while
being informed of the need for additional questioning. The secondary screening room was located inside
the mobile screening module, adjoining the primary screening room, and consisted of a small room
outfitted with audio and video surveillance equipment and two chairs. Once the participant was seated,
a third officer entered the secondary screening room, introduced himself, and sat directly across from
the participant. At this point, the officer began interviewing the participant based on one of three
randomly assigned scripts: direct questioning, anxiety-based, or cognitive-based approach (see Appendix
A).
Each interview began with a brief period of rapport building by manipulating similarity, liking,
and empathy of the interviewer. This was accomplished through the interviewer smiling while
introducing himself, shaking hands with the participant, and nodding early in the interaction. Rapport
building has been shown to have a positive effect on interviews such that the interviewee provides more
correct information without an observable increase in inaccurate information (Collins, Lynch, & Frank,
2002). This rapport building period was followed by several interview prompts or questions which varied
depending on condition. Each interview lasted about 5 min and all interviewers were extensively trained
in each interview approach (see Table 2).
The direct questioning interview served as a baseline comparison condition in which participants
were asked basic questions about their intent after leaving the screening. For example, the interviewer
asked questions like, “How did you find out about this position?” and “Do you have anything you’d like
to tell me about your intentions today?” The interviewers’ tone was neutral and posture was more
formal.
The anxiety-based interview was modeled after techniques currently used in law enforcement
interrogations and consisted of questions intended to increase the anxiety and pressure placed on
participants. For instance, the interviewer said, “I don’t believe that you are here to work today. Tell me
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why you’re really here.” The interviewers’ tone was confrontational and more aggressive than the direct
questioning and cognitive load approaches.
The cognitive-based approach incorporated several of the interventions developed by Vrij and
colleagues (Vrij et al., 2010) previously described, including reverse order recall and asking unexpected
questions such as “How do you get to the kitchen from the screening module?” and “Ok, now can you
tell me those directions in reverse order from the kitchen to the screening module?” The interviewer
approached the interview in a more information gathering manner using a conversational tone,
friendlier demeanor, and more relaxed posture.
Several steps measures were put in place in order to ensure that the officers were delivering the
interview scripts consistently and accurately. Interviewers performed only one script each day and were
informed the previous day which script would be performed the following day. This was intended to
prevent script contamination and interference and allowed the interviewers to rehearse the day’s script
upon arrival to the mobile screening lab. The researcher observed a majority of secondary interviews
and provided immediate feedback to the interviewer about tone and script adherence. Additionally, the
interviewers completed a self assessment of script adherence and reported any inconsistencies and
anomalies after each participant completed screening. Based on these measures, interviews that varied
significantly from the scripts were removed from analyses.
Once the secondary interview was completed, participants were escorted out of the screening
module and instructed to continue into the facility through the employee entrance. A researcher was
waiting near the screening exit to meet the participant, escort them back to the research office, and
debrief participants about the true nature of the study.
Day Two Debriefing. During debriefing, participants completed a series of dependent measures
questionnaires. In addition to gathering information about the participants’ impressions of primary
screening, participants were asked about their impressions of the secondary screening interview.
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Participants were asked about the pressure they felt during the interview to reveal information, the
amount of stress they felt during the interview, and how anxious they were during the interview. These
questions serve as dependent measures and also provide insight into how much participants “bought
into” the scenario. Participants were also probed regarding any suspicions they had about the true
purpose of the experiment as an additional measure of participant “buy in.” Once all questionnaires
were completed, participants were paid, thanked for their time, and escorted out of the facility.
Several questions on the dependent measures questionnaire focused on anxiety and
nervousness throughout the screening process including how anxious the participant felt walking to the
screening, entering the screening, speaking with officer 1, officer 2, and officer 3. Other variables
included how stressed, worried, nervous, and anxious participants felt during the interview. A factor
analysis revealed that the factor loadings for these variables ranged from .622 to .878 (α = .913), yielding
a single measure of anxiety. In addition to the anxiety questions, several questions focused on the guilt
participants experienced during screening. These included how guilty participants felt about completing
their instructions, lying to the various officers, and lying during the interview. Also included in this factor
was how immoral participants believed it was to complete their instructions and lie to the officers.
Given the range of factor loadings for these variables (.749 to .910, α = .869), these variables were
combined into a single measure of guilt. Finally, two questions measured how prepared participants felt
and if they believed they had enough time to prepare for their tasks. The factor loading for these
measures was .830, again yielding a single measure of preparedness.
Because of the realism of the study, several safety precautions were followed to avoid adverse
events. All research assistants were trained and prepared to deal with any unexpected adverse
reactions to the study including security breaches and highly emotional participant responses.
Additionally, before data collection began, there was a safety and security briefing for all research
assistants, security officers, and system operators involved in the experiment.
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In addition to the participant questionnaires, other dependent measures were collected. After
each participant completed the entire screening process, the officers recorded whether or not they
believed the participant had malintent and which specific cues they used to make their determination.
The primary goal of the FAST screening technology is to make determinations of malintent based on
features from noncontact sensors during primary screening. Participants’ predicted malintent status
based on sensor information from primary screening was compared with the secondary interviewers’
determination of malintent status. This analysis determines whether or not a participant sent to
secondary because of suspicion of malintent in primary screening would have subsequently been
detected during the secondary interview. The results of this analysis serve as a measure of the
diagnosticity and the operational utility of the interview techniques.
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Results and Discussion
Participant Perceptions of Interview Context. To assess anxiety before and after screening,
participants completed the STAI trait form during the day one briefing and the state form before and
after screening on day two. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was run to assess the effects of malintent
status and interview condition on trait anxiety levels. As would be expected based on random
assignment, results indicated no significant difference in trait anxiety levels across malintent conditions,
F (1, 138) = .97, ns., ηp2 = .01, and interview conditions, F (2, 138) = .48, ns., ηp2 < .01, and no interaction
effects, F (2, 138) = .48, ns., ηp2 < .01.
To assess state anxiety before and after screening as a function of malintent status (truthful vs.
malintent) and interview condition (direct vs. cognitive vs. anxiety), a 2 x 2 x 3 repeated measures
ANOVA was conducted. There was a main effect of time, F (1, 138) = 56.88, p < .001, ηp2 = .29, 95% CI
[.17, .40] such that state anxiety was higher after screening (M = 32.34, SD = 10.58) than before
screening (M = 26.67, SD = 6.68). There was also a significant time by interview condition interaction, F
(2, 138) = 3.13, p < .05, ηp2 = .04, 95% CI [.00, .12]. As predicted, participants interviewed using the
anxiety-based interview reported higher levels of anxiety post screening than participants in either of
the other interview conditions (see Figure 1). While this difference was not found to be significant in
post hoc analyses, a review of the effect sizes reveals that effect size was nearly double for the anxietybased interview (d = .81) compared to the cognitive-based (d = .46) and direct (d = .55) interviews.
Interestingly, there was no effect of malintent status on state anxiety, F (1, 138) = 1.89, ns., ηp2 = .01.
In addition to the STAI, participants also completed self report measures of anxiety, guilt, and
level of preparedness for the day’s tasks experienced during the screening process. As previously
discussed, related variables were combined into three latent variables: anxiety, guilt, and preparedness
(see Table 3 for means and standard deviations of all three factors). A 2 x 3 ANOVA was conducted to
investigate the effect of malintent status and interview condition for each variable.
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For participants’ self-reported anxiety, results indicated that, as predicted, malintent
participants (M = .18, SD = 1.03) felt more anxiety throughout the screening process than did truthful
participants (M = -.18, SD = .94), F (1, 138) = 4.81, p < .05, ηp2 = .03, 95% CI [.00, .11]. There was no effect
of interview condition on anxiety, F (2, 138) = .31, ns., ηp2 = .01, and no interaction effect, F (2, 138) =
.80, ns., ηp2 = .01.
For participants’ feelings of guilt, a main effect of malintent status was observed, F (1, 137) =
4.81, p < .05, ηp2 = .03, 95% CI [.00, .11]. Malintent participants (M = .68, SD = .94) felt more guilt than
truthful participants (M = -.69, SD = .42). There was no effect of interview condition on feelings of guilt, F
(2, 137) = .46, ns., ηp2 = .01, and no interaction effect, F (2, 137) = .21, ns., ηp2 < .01.
Finally, analysis of participants’ feelings of preparedness indicated that malintent participants
(M = -.29, SD = .94) felt less prepared than truthful participants (M = .29, SD = .97), F (1, 138) = 13.81, p <
.001, ηp2 = .09, 95% CI [.02, .19]. Additionally, a main effect of interview condition was also observed, F
(2, 138) = 4.33, p < .05, ηp2 = .06, 95% CI [.00, .14]. Participants interviewed using the cognitive-based
script (M = -.26, SD = 1.11) felt less prepared than those interviewed using the direct script (M = .30, SD
= 1.00), t (94) = 2.60, p < .05, d = -.53, 95% CI [-.85, -.25]. This finding confirms the manipulation that
questions in the cognitive-based interview were unanticipated and participants felt they were unable to
entirely prepare or rehearse their story for the interview. Feelings of preparedness were also lower for
participants in the cognitive-based interview condition compared to the anxiety-based condition (M = .04, SD = .80); however, this difference was not significant, t (94) = 1.12, ns. The interaction effect was
not significant, F (2, 138) = .50, ns., ηp2 = .01.
Interviewer and Screening System Accuracy. The screening process involved several steps with
participants interacting with several security officers and the screening system (see Figure 2). Officer 1
greeted participants outside the screening module and escorted them inside where Officer 2 operated
the screening system and asked the screening questions. The interviewer then met participants inside
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the secondary screening room and further questioned participants based on one of the experimental
interview scripts. In order to examine the accuracy of each stop of the screening process, malintent
decisions were collected from security officers after each participant completed screening. In addition,
the screening system provided a classification for each participant based on the physiological sensors
(see Table 4).
Officer 1. Officer 1 was the first person participants encountered when entering the screening
system. The security officer would greet the participant, ask for their identification and work schedule,
and then escort the participant into the primary screening system (see Figure 2). After this brief
interaction, the officers were asked to make determinations of the participant’s malintent status.
Overall, Officer 1 accuracy was near chance (54.9%, p > .05) and there was evidence of a truth bias as
officers were significantly more accurate in classifying truthful participants (84.5%) when compared with
malintent participants (25.4%), χ² (1) = 50.18, p < .001 (see Table 4).
Physiological measures. Once questioning in primary screening was complete, the screening
system’s real time decision algorithm fused data from the physiological sensors in order to make a
determination of whether or not a participant needed further screening (see Figure 2). There was no
significant difference in classification accuracies between truthful participants and malintent
participants, χ² (1) = 1.20, ns. (see Table 4), and overall physiological sensor accuracy was 58.9%, which
was greater than chance (p < .05). It should be noted that improvements to the real time decision
algorithm based on previous data collection and development efforts are ongoing. For this study,
upgrades were not implemented due to resource restrictions, but these upgrades will be implemented
as the program moves towards a more operational context.
Officer 2. Officer 2 was standing behind a podium inside the mobile screening system. The
security officer greeted participants, gave instructions for screening, calibrated the physiological
sensors, asked the RRP questions, and escorted participants into secondary screening (see Figure 2).
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After this phase of screening, which lasted about 7 min, Officer 2 made a determination of malintent
status. Overall, Officer 2 accuracy was again no different than chance (47.2%, p > .05) and there was no
difference between malintent and truthful classification, χ² (1) = 1.78, ns. (see Table 4).
Interviewer. After participants had completed the primary screening, they were escorted into
the secondary screening room. The interviewer entered the secondary screening room, introduced
himself, and then began interviewing the participant based on one of the three interview methods
evaluated. Each interview took less than 10 min. After each interview was complete, the interviewer
determined whether or not the participant had malintent. A 3 x 2 hierarchical loglinear analysis was
performed in order to assess whether interviewer accuracy varied as a function of participant condition
and interview condition. Overall classification accuracy was at chance levels (48.3%, p > .05). Contrary to
my hypothesis, neither the malintent status x interview method interaction, χ² (2) = 3.50, ns., nor the
main effect of interview method, χ² (1) = 1.36, ns., were significant (see Table 5). There was a significant
effect of malintent status, χ² (1) =51.36, p < .001, such that interviewer accuracy was higher for truthful
participants (77.5%) compared to malintent participants (19.4%) (see Table 4). This suggests that
interviews displayed a truth bias when making malintent determinations.
Malintent classification. In addition to the accuracy rates of each step in the screening process,
we were interested in examining the accuracy rates of the interviewers for malintent participants that
the screening system algorithm classified as having malintent. This analysis provides practical
information about classification performance and diagnosticity in an operational setting. The question
is: if a person has malintent and the screening system recommends further screening, would the
interviewer detain the individual? Thirty-eight participants with malintent were correctly classified by
the screening system algorithm based on physiological measures. After secondary screening, only seven
(18.4%) of these participants were correctly identified by the interviewers as having malintent. Four out
of twelve participants were correctly identified using the direct script, two out of fourteen using the
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cognitive-based method, and one out of twelve using the anxiety-based method. After primary
screening, the screening system correctly identified and recommended 54.3% of malintent participants
for secondary screening. Of those sent to secondary screening, 18.4% were correctly identified by the
interviewers as having malintent leading to an overall malintent detection rate of 10% with both the
screening system and the interviewer correctly identifying seven participants out of 70 participants with
malintent. The percentage of truthful participants falsely identified as having malintent was also
examined. The primary screening system falsely identified 26 (36.6%) truthful participants as having
malintent. In secondary screening, four of those participants were classified by the interviewer as having
malintent leading to an overall false alarm rate of 6%.
Summary and Conclusions. Participants believing they were going to work as temporary
catering staff went through a screening process in order to enter a mock event. Some of these
participants were planning on disrupting the event (malintent) while others were just going to work for
the day (truthful). Overall, the screening process made people more anxious, but malintent participants
and those participants interviewed using the anxiety-based method felt even more anxious than other
participants. Additionally, malintent participants and those interviewed using the cognitive-based script
felt less prepared for their assigned tasks, suggesting that participants felt like the cognitive-based
questions were unexpected and malintent participants felt they did not have enough time to rehearse
their cover story.
Accuracy of the security officers, regardless of where they were positioned in the screening
process, was at chance levels (ps > .05), which would be expected based on previous research on
deception detection performance (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Vrij, 2008). However, contrary to previous
research demonstrating that law enforcement professionals usually display a guilt bias, the contracted
security officers in this study actually displayed a truth bias. The security professionals in this study had
little previous interviewing and deception detection experience, and this may explain the truth bias that
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is sometimes seen in research conducted with non-law enforcement professionals as participants
(Meissner & Kassin, 2002; 2004).
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Phase 2
Once the screening phase of the experiment was complete, the videos from the secondary
screening interviews were processed and two different types of reviews were completed. First, to
evaluate independent observers’ judgments of the interviews, a subset of the videos (N = 60) were
reviewed by participants who made veracity determinations for each video. Next, in order to examine
whether behavioral cues varied as a function of interview type or malintent status, two trained research
assistants reviewed each video and rated them using the Psychologically Based Credibility Assessment
Tool (PBCAT).
Method
Participants. Eighty-six participants (N = 86) were recruited from the University of Texas at El
Paso through the web-based experimental signup software (Sona Systems). Participants were mostly
female (62.8%) and Hispanic (72.1%) with a mean age of 21.01 (SD = 5.20) years old.
Design. A 2 (malintent vs. truthful) x 3 (cognitive-based vs. anxiety-based vs. direct) mixed
factorial design was employed, with participants exposed to both malintent and truthful conditions and
interview condition manipulated between subjects.
Procedure. Participants viewed a series of five malintent and five truthful videos from one of the
interview conditions. Videos were randomly selected from the larger pool of videos collected in Phase 1
of the study, and presentation order of the videos was randomized across participants. Participants
were told that the videos were of people being interviewed about their intentions for the rest of the day
and that some were being honest while others were lying about their intentions. For each video,
participants provided a veracity judgment. Additionally, participants rated how much pressure the
interviewer placed on the participant, how much stress the participant seemed to be experiencing, and
how hard the participant had to think about their responses.
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PBCAT assessment of cues to deception. Two research assistants trained in using the PBCAT
(Appendix B) rated the secondary screening videos. This tool is derived from empirically-based evidence
on the cues that have been shown to be the most predictive of deception, and thus could be used to
determine malintent status (Evans, Meissner, & Brandon, 2010). During the initial training, the research
assistants thoroughly reviewed definitions and examples of each of the cues as well as how to complete
and score the tool. Once the videos had been processed, the researchers reviewed 10 sample videos.
After discussion about discrepancies, the researchers each reviewed 5 additional videos and compared
results. This process was completed until the researchers were within one point on the scale for each of
the cues. The researchers then reviewed 140 videos used in the previous analyses. Four videos were not
available for analysis due to technical issues with audio or video quality.
The current version of the PBCAT consists of seven cues to truth and four cues to deception that
have been empirically validated in previous research (see DePaulo et al., 2003). Initial research using the
PBCAT reveals that diagnosticity is improved with interviews employing cognitive load inducing
techniques (Evans et al., 2010).
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Results and Discussion
Observer Video Ratings. Accuracy of participants’ judgments were examined via a 2 (malintent
vs. truthful) x 3 (direct vs. cognitive vs. anxiety) repeated measures ANOVA. Results revealed a main
effect of veracity, F (1, 83) = 223.77, p < .001, ηp² = .73, 95% CI [.63, .77], indicating that participants
were more accurate on truthful trials (77.7%) when compared with malintent trials (19.1%). These
findings are nearly identical to the interviewers and suggest that independent observers also display a
truth bias when making veracity judgments of intent (see Table 4). Contrary to my prediction, there was
no effect of interview condition, F (2, 83) = 1.97, ns., ηp² = .05, and no significant interaction effect, F (2,
83) = .79, ns., ηp² = .02. The observed effect sizes were small and there was insufficient power to detect
the effects.
Veracity judgments were separated into the proportion of correctly identified malintent
participants (hits) and the proportion of truthful videos incorrectly identified as malintent (false alarms)
for each rater. These rates were then used to compute signal detection estimates of discrimination
accuracy (AZ) and response bias (c). To examine whether discrimination varied as a function of interview
method, a one-way ANOVA was conducted. Results indicated no significant differences in discrimination
across interview methods, F (2, 83) = .68, ns., ηp² = .02. Another ANOVA was conducted in order to
examine whether participants displayed a response bias as a function of interview method. Again,
results indicated no significant differences in response bias across interview conditions, F (2, 83) = 1.21,
ns., ηp² = .03 (see Table 6).
A series of 2 (malintent vs. truthful) by 3 (anxiety-based vs. cognitive-based vs. direct) ANOVAs
were conducted to examine raters’ impressions of pressure, stress, and level of thought. For pressure
ratings, results indicated a main effect of interview condition, F (2, 54) = 18.27, p < .001, ηp2 = .40, 95%
CI [.19, .54], such that participants believed interviewers placed more pressure on interviewees in the
anxiety-based script (M = 2.51, SD = .37) than either the cognitive-based script (M = 1.96, SD = .32) or
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the direct script (M = 2.11, SD = .16), ts (38) = 5.09 and 4.53, ps < .001, ds = 1.63 and 1.44, 95% CIs [1.47,
1.63], [1.28, 1.51], respectively. A similar pattern was observed when participants rated how much
stress the interviewee was under, F (2, 54) = 5.39, p < .01, ηp2 = .17, 95% CI [.01, .32]. Participants
interviewed using the anxiety-based method (M = 2.56, SD = .55) appeared to be under significantly
more stress than those participants interviewed using either the cognitive-based method (M = 2.15, SD =
.43) or the direct method (M = 2.14, SD = .42), ts (38) = 2.64 and 2.67, ps < .05, ds = .85 and .88, 95% CIs
[.61, 1.04], [.64, 1.06], respectively. Raters did not observe any significant differences in how hard
participants had to think about their responses as a function of malintent status, F (1, 54) = .54, ns., ηp2 =
.01 or interview method, F (2, 54) = .75, ns., ηp2 = .03.
PBCAT. Two trained research assistants reviewed and coded the secondary interview videos
using the PBCAT.
Inter-rater reliability. Once all the videos had been rated by both researchers using the PBCAT,
inter-rater reliability was evaluated. This was done in two ways. First, correlations and kappas were
calculated for continuous and categorical cues, respectively. For continuous cues, correlations ranged
from .73 to .79 with the exception of one cue – namely, how hard the participant had to think (r = .46).
For categorical cues, kappas ranged from .65 to .77. As an additional measure of reliability, rater
agreement was defined as an individual cue score being within 1 point on the scale. For example, if one
rater scored a cue as a 0.5 and the other rater scored the same cue as a 1.0, they were considered to be
in agreement. However, if one rater scored a cue as a -0.5 and the other rater scored this same cue as a
1.0; this was not considered an agreement. When analyzed in this manner, percentage of agreement
between the two raters across cues ranged from 95 – 100%. Based on these two measures of reliability,
the scores from one rater were chosen randomly to be analyzed.
PBCAT cues. In order to assess the effects of participant condition and interview type on the 11
PBCAT cues, a 2 (malintent vs. truthful) x 3 (anxiety-based vs. cognitive-based vs. direct interview)
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multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was performed. In partial support of predictions, results
indicated a significant effect of interview method, F (22, 250) = 4.83, p < .001, ηp2 = .30, 95% CI [.15, .33],
but no effect of malintent condition, F (11, 124) = .75, ns., ηp2 = .06, and no interaction, F (22, 250) =
1.25, ns., ηp2 = .10. Sufficient power was observed to detect the interaction effect had it been present
(observed power = .88). The Bonferroni method for controlling for type I error rate was used to evaluate
each of the 11 cues using a revised p value of .005. Four cues were found to significantly differentiate
between interview conditions. Participants in the cognitive-based interview provided significantly more
spatial details than those in either the anxiety or direct interviews, F (2, 135) = 34.12, p < .001, ηp2 = .34,
95% CI [.21, .44] (see Table 7 for means and standard deviations). The cognitive-based interview yielded
more details than either of the other two interview methods, F (2, 135) = 8.19, p < .001, ηp2 = .11, 95% CI
[.02, .20]. Participants in the cognitive condition were judged to have thought harder than those in the
anxiety and direct conditions, F (2, 135) = 9.07, p < .001, ηp2 = .12, 95% CI [.03, .22]. Finally, those in the
cognitive condition also admitted not remembering more often than those in either the anxiety or direct
interviews, F (2, 135) = 13.61, p < .001, ηp2 = .17, 95% CI [.06, .27].
In order to examine whether PBCAT cues differentiated malintent from truthful participants
within each interview condition, MANOVAs were completed for each interview method. There were no
significant differences between malintent and truthful for any of the interview types, (Anxiety F (10, 36)
= 1.12, ns., ηp2 = .24; Direct, F (10, 37) = .91, ns., ηp2 = .20; Cognitive F (11, 33) = 1.24, ns., ηp2 = .29).
PBCAT Accuracy. To further investigate the utility of the PBCAT in detecting malintent, a mean
score of the 11 cues was calculated. Data was entered such that higher ratings on each individual cue
were indicative of truth. A mean score was computed by summing the scores for all of the cues and
dividing by the total number of cues (11). Since zero is the median point of each of the cues with
negative ratings indicating deception and positive ratings indicating truth, a decision rule was created
such that mean scores less than zero would be considered malintent and mean scores greater than zero
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would be truthful. The default decision was truthful in cases where the mean was equal to zero in order
to replicate real world conditions in which malintent would occur at a low base rate. From this decision,
PBCAT accuracy was computed. A 2 (malintent vs. truthful) x 3 (anxiety-based vs. cognitive-based vs.
direct) ANOVA was conducted to determine if accuracy varied as a function of either of these variables.
Results indicated a significant malintent condition x interview method interaction, F (2, 135) = 3.89, p <
.05, ηp2 = .05, 95% CI [.00, .13], such that PBCAT accuracy rates were highest when participants with
malintent were interviewed with the cognitive-based script (M = .71, SD = .46) compared to any of the
other interview methods (anxiety-based M = .46, SD = .51; direct M = .46, SD = .51). However, for
truthful participants, PBCAT accuracy was lowest for those interviewed using the cognitive-based script
(M = .23, SD = .43) compared to the other interview methods (anxiety-based M = .48, SD = .51; direct M
= .46, SD = .51) (see Figure 3). These findings suggest that the cognitive-based interview facilitated
malintent detection, but impeded correct classification of truthful participants.
Summary and Conclusions. After all of the interviews had been conducted, independent
observers watched a subset of the videos. As would be expected based on previous literature,
observers displayed a truth bias (Meissner & Kassin, 2002; 2004). There was no difference in observer
accuracy across interview conditions. In addition to the observers, each video was rated using the
PBCAT. More cues to deception were elicited in the cognitive-based script and PBCAT accuracy was
highest for malintent participants interviewed using this method. Based on these results, it appears that
the cognitive-based interview increases malintent detection when using the PBCAT, but fails to improve
interviewer or observer accuracy. The observed effect sizes were small and as a result there was
insufficient power to detect significant effects.
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Predicting Malintent across the Interview Context
We were also interested in assessing the predictive validity of judgments of veracity made
throughout the screening process and interview context. This includes the judgments made by each of
the security officers that interacted with participants, the screening system judgments based on
psychophysiological and behavioral measures of malintent, the interviewer judgments, and third party
observers.
In order to examine the predictive validity of each step of the screening process, a hierarchical
logistic regression was performed using the decision from the first officer that checked for identification
and work schedule, the primary screening system’s algorithm decision, the primary screening officer’s
decision to send the participant to secondary screening, the interviewers’ decision of malintent status,
and the computed PBCAT decision previously described entered chronologically (see Figure 2).
Malintent judgments from officer 1 did not significantly contribute to malintent prediction, χ² (1) = 1.62,
ns., and overall classification was 54.8% (see Table 8 for b, Wald, ORs, and classification accuracy for the
overall model). The screening system decision was entered into the model next and significantly
contributed to the model, χ² (1) = 4.21, p < .05, pseudo R² = .06, with classification accuracy reaching
59.4%. The officer 2 decision and the interviewer decision were entered separately and neither
contributed significantly, χ² (1) = .55, ns., and χ² (1) = .02, ns., respectively. Finally, the PBCAT decisions
were entered into the model and did not significantly contribute to malintent prediction, χ² (1) = .69, ns.
Overall classification accuracy reached 58.0%.
This analysis was further broken down by interview approach to investigate the utility of each
interview method. For the cognitive interview method, the interviewer’s malintent decision contributed
significantly to malintent prediction when entered in the model, χ² (1) = 4.35, p < .05, pseudo R2 = .19
and overall yielded an accuracy rate of 68.1%; however, the interviewer decision was not a significant
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predictor of malintent in the overall model (see Table 9). There were no significant predictors for the
anxiety-based or direct interview methods (see Table 9).
Summary and Conclusions. The decision points throughout the screening process were
examined in order to determine the predictive validity of each step. The system algorithm, which is
based on the physiological sensors, was the only significant predictor of malintent in the overall model.
Additionally, when the analysis was broken down by interview condition, the interviewer’s decision was
the only significant predictor in the cognitive-based interview condition. There were no significant
predictors in either of the other interview conditions.
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General Discussion
Interviewers and independent observers obtained modest malintent classification accuracy
rates, regardless of the interview condition. In addition, both of these groups displayed a truth bias
when making determination as to malintent status. And, as has been observed in the deception
detection literature, malintent detection performance was no better than chance (Bond & DePaulo,
2006; Vrij, 2008). Overall classification accuracies for the individual decision points in the screening
process ranged from 46.8% to 58.9% with hit rates for detecting malintent ranging between 19.1% and
54.3%. In both instances, the highest correct classification rates were from the screening system
decision algorithm, which is based on noncontact physiological signals. The psychophysiological
measures provided the most diagnostic information when attempting to classify malintent.
Malintent Detection vs. Deception Detection
The goal of the screening system evaluated in this study is to detect malintent. Since research
on future intent and cues to malintent is lacking (Martin et al., 2007; Granhag, 2010), the theory of
malintent draws from deception detection research to provide insight into the behavioral and
psychophysiological cues that may be indicative of malintent. The results from the current study, as well
as previous studies using the same screening system, demonstrate consistency between
psychophysiological indicators of deception and malintent.
One objective of the current study was to investigate verbal and nonverbal malintent cues by
examining whether or not cues indicative of deception were also indicative of malintent. The PBCAT is
based on empirically validated cues to deception and has been found to be a useful tool in detecting
deception (Evans, Meissner, & Brandon, 2010). When raters used the PBCAT to analyze secondary
screening videos, certain cues (e.g., spatial details, the overall quantity of details, and admitted lack of
memory) were elicited, especially in the cognitive-based script. Additionally, raters believed participants
had to think harder about their responses in the cognitive-based interview. These results confirm that
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the cognitive-based interview is performing as expected by eliciting more information and placing
increased cognitive load on participants. However, the PBCAT cues did not differentiate malintent and
truthful participants. While this finding needs to be investigated further and replicated, it may point to
differences between verbal and nonverbal cues indicative of malintent and deception.
Previous deception detection research reveals that both professionals and laypeople perform at
chance levels in deception detection tasks (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Vrij, 2008). This same result was
observed when both interviewers and independent observers completed malintent detection tasks.
Both interviewers and observers obtained low accuracy rates and displayed a truth bias when
determining malintent status. Observers may have had difficulty classifying participants due to the
context of the interview. Interviewees discussed their intentions and plans for the day which were
relatively mundane events that may not engender much suspicion on the part of the observers. Overall,
there was little accusation and direct confrontation on the part of the interviewer, especially in the
direct and cognitive-based interviews, which may have made this task particularly challenging for
observers. Observing and classifying verbal and nonverbal behavior proves to be a difficult task, whether
detecting deception or malintent.
Effect of Interview Method
It was predicted that accuracy of interviewers and independent observers would increase for
participants interviewed using the cognitive-based method because the increased cognitive load placed
on participants with malintent would elicit cues to deception. Results from the PBCAT ratings indicated
that several cues to deception were elicited, especially in the cognitive-based interview. In addition,
detection of malintent participants using the PBCAT was facilitated when the cognitive-based interview
was used. However, truth detection was lowest for the cognitive-based interview condition compared to
the anxiety-based and direct interview methods. These results support previous research demonstrating
that cognitive load approaches to deception detection are more diagnostic when employed with liars
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and demonstrate little gain when used with truth tellers (Evans, Meissner, & Brandon, 2010).
Interestingly, when a decision criterion was created using the mean score of the PBCAT, a significant
increase in malintent classification accuracy in the cognitive-based interview was observed. In addition,
the predictive models of malintent by interview method revealed that the cognitive-based and direct
interviewing methods explain more variance in the models and yielded higher accuracy rates than the
anxiety-based method.
There was no difference in classification accuracy across any of the interview conditions for the
independent observers. While raters using the PBCAT were asked to rate empirically validated cues to
deception, independent observers and interviewers were given no instructions about nonverbal or
verbal cues to deception or malintent. The difference between observer and interviewer accuracy
compared to the PBCAT ratings could be a function of raters and interviewers relying on nondiagnostic
cues when making malintent determinations. This finding also supports previous research
demonstrating that people display erroneous beliefs about which cues are indicative of deception
(Kassin, Meissner, & Norwick, 2005; Meissner & Kassin, 2002). Future work should further investigate
the relationship between deception and malintent and work to empirically validate verbal and
nonverbal malintent cues.
The Screening Process
The screening system utilizes signals from noncontact physiological sensors in order to make
recommendations about secondary screening for malintent. While the security officer’s determination
factors into the system’s algorithm and he or she can ultimately override the recommendation, the
psychophysiological measures provided the most diagnostic information when attempting to classify
malintent. When the malintent determinations of each step in the screening process were entered into
the predictive model, overall accuracy reached 59.4%. This classification rate was identical when
examining only primary screening, indicating that in its current state, secondary screening added no
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diagnostic information to the screening system. Further, when examining classification accuracy of
malintent participants that would have been sent to secondary screening, overall accuracy was only
10%. These accuracy rates are inadequate for screening in general and highlight the need for continued
research and development.
It should be noted that this was the first investigation of malintent utilizing only noncontact
sensors. Previous research using contact sensors has obtained higher classification results (i.e.,
classification rates have been as high as 81% accurate). Additionally, the algorithm that was used for this
study to fuse the physiological data and maximize malintent detection was created using data from
previous investigations and had not been updated for the current investigation. Based on these planned
updates to the screening system and algorithm, it is expected that future classification accuracy will
improve. In fact, subsequent analyses conducted by the research team on this data using the larger
sample of participants and discriminant function analysis have achieved classification accuracy rates of
73%.
Limitations and Future Research
It has been noted that future research should continue investigating the relationship between
malintent and deception and specifically work to determine and validate verbal and nonverbal
indicators of malintent. Previous research reveals that strategic interview techniques that increase the
cognitive load placed on interviewees can actively elicit cues to deception and improve classification
accuracy (Vrij et al., 2010). While results from the PBCAT indicate that some cues were elicited in the
cognitive-based script that utilized several of these techniques, accuracy rates for interviewers and
observers were lower than expected.
The lack of significant findings could be due to several factors. The scenario employed in the
current study varied considerably from other studies. Participants were informed that they would need
to go through security screening in order to gain access to the facility where they would be working for
39

the day. In previous research, participants witnessed an event or engaged in another activity and were
interviewed about their experience. Some participants told the truth during the interview while others
lied. In the current study, participants were interviewed after going through primary screening, but
before they completed either a malicious task or went to work for the day. Malintent participants were
attempting to conceal their true intent during the interview compared to deceptive participants in
previous studies that were attempting to conceal their earlier activities. In addition to differences in the
context of the study and experimental scenario, this investigation incorporated a combination of
strategic interview techniques compared to previous research that usually employed only one or two
techniques. Future research should examine the utility of different combinations of interventions in
both false intent and deception detection contexts.
It could be argued that the nonsignificant findings are the result of other factors like poor
interview script adherence and weak experimental manipulations. However, interviewers were carefully
observed throughout data collection and were given immediate feedback about script variations and
anomalies. Results show that malintent participants and those participants interviewed using the
anxiety-based interview reported increased anxiety levels indicating that the malintent conditions and
anxiety-based interview manipulations were successful in increasing anxiety levels. Further, consistent
with predictions and prior research, results from the PBCAT indicated that participants interviewed
using the cognitive-based interview were rated as having to think harder about their responses and
provided more information in the form of spatial and overall details. These findings provide evidence
that the experimental interview conditions were successful.
Policy Implications
Deploying an experimental screening system to an operational setting is the ultimate goal of
applied research programs. Before any system can be put into operation, decisions must be made about
acceptable classification rates. The acceptable false positive and false negative rates can vary depending
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on the operational context of the deployed system. Based on the results of this study, the secondary
screening portion of this screening system is not ready for operational use. Future work will need to
investigate and refine diagnostic secondary interview methods that can maximize information and
intelligence elicitation. This initial attempt demonstrated that cognitive load inducing methods show
promise, but other interviewing methods and techniques may further enhance future intent
discrimination accuracy. Further, depending on the operational context, different limitations and
restrictions may be placed on the interview methods employed. For instance, in some contexts,
screeners may be able to interview each individual for an extended period of time. In other operational
contexts, getting individuals through screening quickly may be heavily emphasized and interview
methods would need to be modified to fit this requirement. The current program continues to
investigate the utility of the screening system in various contexts and scenarios in order to increase the
accuracy and validity of the identification of persons planning destructive acts. Various secondary
screening methods will continue to be investigated as part of this research.
Conclusion
The continued existence of threats to national security requires research focusing on the
development screening procedures, methods, and technologies that might aid in the prevention of
future attacks. This is not an easy task. Nearly two million passengers travel through airports daily
(www.tsa.gov) and close to one million passengers and pedestrians are screened daily at borders and
points of entry (www.cbp.gov). These numbers fail to take into account other secure locations and
venues, both public and private, where screening for potential security threats is necessary. The
majority of people going through screening have no malintent, making this task even more difficult. The
ultimate goal is to give screeners a tool to assist in the detection of the malintent. Continued research,
creativity, and hard work will ultimately lead to the development of effective screening procedures,
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interview methods, and technologies that will increase the accuracy and validity of the identification of
persons planning destructive acts.
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Table 1.
Study Design and Conditions.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Interview Method
___________________________________________________________
Malintent Status
Direct
Anxiety-based
Cognitive-based
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Malintent

n = 24

n = 24

n = 24

Truthful
n = 24
n = 24
n = 24
_____________________________________________________________________________________

47

Table 2.
Purpose, Tone, and Posture of Each Interview Type.
____________________________________________________________________________________
Interview Type

Purpose

Tone

Posture

Anxiety-based

Increase anxiety level

Confrontational

Rigid

Cognitive-based

Increase cognitive demand

Conversational

Relaxed

Direct
Comparison, baseline
Neutral
Formal
_____________________________________________________________________________________
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Table 3.
Means and Standard Deviations of Malintent and Truthful Participant Ratings of Anxiety, Guilt, and
Preparedness by Interview Method.
_________________________________________________________________________________
Interview
Malintent
Truthful
_________________________________________________________________________________
Direct
Anxiety

.38 (1.24)

-.21 (1.15)

Guilt

.63 (.98)

-.67 (.53)

-.07 (.92)

.67 (.95)

Anxiety

.19 (.90)

-.23 (.79)

Guilt

.60 (.87)

-.74 (.34)

-.44 (1.06)

-.08 (1.16)

-.02 (.91)

-.11 (.89)

.81 (.99)

-.67 (.38)

-.36 (.85)

.28 (.62)

Prepared
Cognitive

Prepared
Anxiety
Anxiety
Guilt
Prepared

______________________________________________________________________________
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Table 4.
Percentage of Correct Classification Accuracy Throughout the Screening Process.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Decision Point

Malintent

Truthful

Overall

Officer 1

25.4%

84.5%

54.9%

System

54.3%

63.4%

58.9%

Officer 2

41.7%

52.8%

47.2%

Interviewer

19.4%

77.5%

48.3%

PBCAT

54.2%

39.1%

46.8%

Observers
19.1%
77.7%
48.4%
_____________________________________________________________________________________
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Table 5.
Percentage of Correct Classification by Interview Condition for Interviews, Observers, and the PBCAT.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Interview
Interviewers
Observers
PBCAT
_____________________________________________________________________________________

Anxiety

50.0%

48.3%

46.8%

Cognitive

41.7%

51.4%

46.8%

Direct

53.6%

45.4%

45.8%

_____________________________________________________________________________________
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Table 6.
Signal Detection Estimates Means and Standard Deviations by Interview Condition.
____________________________________________________________________________________
C
Interview
Malintent Accuracy
Truth Accuracy
Az
____________________________________________________________________________________

Anxiety

.21 (.18)

.76 (.24)

.49 (.27)

1.04 (.77)

Cognitive

.19 (.18)

.84 (.17)

.52 (.23)

1.30 (.79)

Direct

.18 (.19)

.73 (.30)

.43 (.22)

1.15 (.99)

_____________________________________________________________________________________

52

Table 7.
Means and Standard Deviations for PBCAT Cues by Interview Condition.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Interview Method
___________________________________________________________
Cues
Anxiety
Cognitive
Direct
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Auditory Details

.00 (.00)

.04 (.30)

.00 (.00)

Spatial Details

.09 (.28)

1.04 (.77)

.33 (.60)

Temporal Details

.23 (.48)

.29 (.51)

.19 (.49)

Admitted Lack of Memory

.21 (.46)

.82 (.58)

.40 (.64)

Spontaneous Corrections

.15 (.36)

.20 (.46)

.10 (.68)

Overall Quantity of Details

-.06 (.85)

.48 (.75)

-.09 (.77)

Does the Story Make Sense

.09 (.73)

.32 (.74)

.17 (.69)

Thought Hard

.11 (.55)

-.37 (.63)

.10 (.68)

Nervous/Tense

-.18 (.60)

-.18 (.66)

-.33 (.67)

Negativity

-.06 (.54)

.01 (.62)

.15 (.42)

Rate of Speech

-.09 (.48)

-.30 (.53)

-.23 (.48)

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Note. Bolded cues were found to significantly differentiate between the cognitive-based interview and
the anxiety-based and direct interview methods.
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Table 8.
Hierarchical Logistic Regression Using Screening Decisions Points to Predict Malintent Classification Accuracy.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
B
Wald
p
OR
pseudo R²
95% CI
Accuracy
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Officer 1

.60

1.85

.17

1.83

.02

[-.27, 1.48]

54.3

System

.75

4.41

.04

2.11

.06

[.04, 1.45]

59.4

Officer 2

-.24

.46

.50

.79

.06

[-.94, .46]

59.4

Interviewer

.01

.00

.98

1.01

.06

[-.87, .89]

59.4

PBCAT

-.30

.37

.41

.74

.07

[-1.03, .42]

58.0

_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
*p-values bolded are significant at the .05 level
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Table 9.
Hierarchical Logistic Regression Using Screening Decisions to Predict Malintent Classification Accuracy by Interview
Method.
______________________________________________________________________________________________
Interview
B
Wald
p
OR
pseudo R²
Accuracy
_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Direct
Officer 1

.93

1.55

.21

2.53

.06

59.1

System

.77

.66

.25

2.16

.11

65.9

Officer 2

-.78

.68

.25

.46

.15

70.5

Interviewer

.32

.78

.68

1.38

.16

68.2

PBCAT

.120

.68

.86

1.13

.16

68.2

Officer 1

.88

1.12

.29

2.41

.02

55.3

System

.70

1.10

.29

2.02

.04

53.2

Officer 2

-.03

.00

.96

.97

.04

53.2

Interviewer

.40

.23

.63

1.49

.04

53.2

PBCAT

-.58

.79

.38

.56

.06

55.3

Officer 1

-.63

.48

.49

.52

.00

51.1

System

1.25

3.53

.06

3.48

.08

61.7

Officer 2

.81

1.22

.27

2.42

.08

61.7

Interviewer

-1.85

3.18

.07

.16

.19

63.8

PBCAT

-.54

.64

.43

.58

.21

68.1

Anxiety

Cognitive

________________________________________________________________________________________________
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Figure 1. Mean state STAI scores pre and post screening by interview condition.
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Figure 2. Malintent decision points throughout the screening process.
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Figure 3. PBCAT mean score decision accuracy rates by malintent status and interview condition.
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Appendix A
Secondary Screening Scripts




The interviewer will wait in the Command and Control module until the participant is finished
with Primary Screening.
The interviewer will then proceed to the Screening module and enter through the back door.
The interviewer will introduce himself, shake hands with the participant, and smile and nod
during the introduction:

Hi, my name is __________, and I am another security officer at this facility.
What’s your first name?
How are you doing today?



The interviewer will then be seated across from the participant in the chair in front of the
participant exit door.
The interviewer will then begin questioning using one of the following scripts:

1. Direct Questioning Approach (Script D)
Tone and Posture
 Neutral and formal
Before I let you go into the facility today, I have a few more questions I need to ask you. Please answer all
of my questions honestly and be as detailed as possible. This will help me get you into the building to
work.
1. So what are you doing at the facility today?
a. How did you find out about this position?
2. What kind of work do you think you’ll specifically be doing today?
a. Ok, so once you get inside the building, where are you headed?
3. Are you planning to engage in any prohibited activities while in the facility today?
a. Do you understand what activities are prohibited inside the facility?
b. If No: Prohibited activities include carrying a weapon or other contraband, recording any
information and smoking inside the facility. Do you plan on engaging in any of these
activities?
4. Do you have any alternative intentions once you enter the facility you haven’t told me about?
a. Is there anything else you’d like to tell me about your plans for today?
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Ok, thank you for answering all of my questions. You may now enter the facility.

2. Anxiety-based Approach (Script A)
Tone and Posture


Confrontational and stern

Hi, my name is __________, and I am another security officer at this facility.
What’s your first name?
How are you doing today?
Before I let you go into the facility today, I have a few more questions I need to ask you. Please answer all
of my questions honestly and be as detailed as possible. This will help me get you into the building to
work.
1. Do you have any idea why we pulled you aside for additional questioning?
a. This system’s never been wrong and it flagged you for additional questioning. Can you
think of any reasons why you might have been flagged?
2. So, what are you doing at the facility today?
a. What is your assigned job for today?
b. I’m not convinced that you’re here to work today and you could be in serious trouble if
you’re not being honest with me. Tell me why you’re really here.
3. So, you work in the food service industry (insert specific occupation if stated)?
a. For how long?
b. Have you ever worked at this facility before?
c. We don’t have many people come and work just for special events. Are you being honest
about your plan for today?
4. Ok, (Participant’s name), you seem like an honest person and I don’t want to interfere with your
job. If you’re up front with me about your intentions at the facility, I can get you out of here
quickly and you can get to work. So, where do you plan on going after you get done with
screening?
a. So, if I watched once you left here, I would see you head towards (location participant
stated)?
b. Is there anything else you want to tell me about your intentions here today?
Ok, thank you for answering all of my questions. You can now go ahead into the facility.
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3. Cognitive-based Approach (Script C)
Tone and Posture


Conversational and relaxed

Hi, my name is __________, and I am another security officer at this facility.
What’s your first name?
How are you doing today?
Before I let you go into the facility today, I have a few more questions I need to ask you. Please answer all
of my questions honestly and be as detailed as possible. This will help me get you into the building to
work.
1. So, why are you here at the facility today?
a. Ok, did you do any sort of planning or preparation for your position today?
b. As you were doing this planning, did you picture yourself doing anything or picture what
the facilities looks like?
c. If yes ask: Can you please describe what you pictured?
i. Is there anything else you can remember about what you pictured?
If no, continue to the next set of questions.
2. What is being served at the event today?
a. Is there anything else you remember from the menu?
3. Now, I’m assuming that since you are working in the building, you know a little about the facility.
Can you tell me, in as much detail as possible, how do you get to the kitchen from where we are
now?
a. Now can you tell me those directions but in reverse order, starting from the kitchen and
ending up here?
b. Are there any other details you can remember about how to get to the kitchen?
4. Ok, I’d like you please take a minute and draw me a picture of the event room layout. Please be
as detailed as possible.
a. Is there anything else you’d like to tell me about your plans today?
Ok, thank you for answering all of my questions. You can now go ahead into the facility.
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Appendix B
PBCAT
Sensory Details

Not Present

Occasional

Frequent

Present

Present

Auditory Details
Spatial Details
Temporal Details
Not Present

(1 or 2 times)

(3 or more times)

Admitted Lack of Memory
Spontaneous Corrections
Very Few Details/
Very Vague
Overall quantity of Details / Talking time

`
Does it Make Sense (contradictions? plausible?)

Numerous Details/
Unsure

Complete

|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|

Not at all

Unsure

Completely

|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
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Did Not Think Hard
Thought hard

Unsure

|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
Extremely Relaxed/

Extremely Tense/

Comfortable
Nervousness (tense? fidgeting?)

Unsure

Neutral/Unsure

Extremely Negative

|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
Extremely Fast

Rate of Speech

Nervous

|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
Extremely Positive

Negativity/Complaints

Thought Extremely Hard

Unsure

Extremely Slow

|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
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